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These two studies by an American independent military analyst, John Hillen and a British 
independent scholar, Richard Singe, (supported by the United States Institute of Peace, 
the Catholic Institute for International Relations in London, and the African Studies 
Center of the University of Cambridge) provide a fresh insight into the corridors of 
international policy and military operations in pursuit of peace. It appears that Hillens 
study emerged from his doctoral dissertation at the University of Oxford, while Singes 
labors were supported by a Washington peace think tank that has a solid record of 
producing well organized and written studies concerning different facets of international 
conflict management and resolution. Of the two studies, Hillens tends to be more in 
keeping with the customary academic format, with maps, tables, figures, a superior 
bibliography, and ample endnotes, but with a somewhat threadbare index. Singes work 
has maps, tables, an index, along with ample endnotes and an appendix. Both studies 
include a range of interviews with key United Nations and military figures.  
Because of his military training and experience as an active duty officer in the US Army 
(although he later transferred to the reserves), Hillen concentrates his attention on the 
military aspects of United Nations peacekeeping, examining a wide range of operations 
from peace observation missions all the way up to the continuum of potential violence to 
peace enforcement. He finds that some of the military difficulties involved in 
peacekeeping can be traced historically to the absence of separate bilateral agreements 
between United Nations and individual military powers as provided for in Article 43 of 
the United Nations Charter, along with the concomitant absence of a Military Staff 
Committee anticipated in Articles 46 and 47. He argues that . . . all thirty-eight military 
operations managed by the United Nations between 1948 and 1996 were improvised 
endeavors, ad hoc enterprises whose legal and political legitimacy were based on a loose 
interpretation of Charter provisions. (p. 9) Consequently, he avers that . . . the UN 
Charter never provided an effective political, strategic, or military foundation for UN 
military operations in the way that the framers of the Charter might have hoped. (p. 9) 
This sets the stage for his inquiry, which is categorical rather than chronological. He 
separates United Nations peacekeeping activities into four clusters, namely, observation 
missions, traditional peacekeeping, what he terms second-generation peacekeeping and 
enforcement. In addition, he provides a case study of each of the four types, so that the 
reader can have a reprise of his general observations when probing UN observation 
missions in Iran and Iraq, traditional peacekeeping in southern Lebanon, second-
generation peacekeeping in Somalia, and peace enforcement in Korea and the Persian 
Gulf.  
His analysis of second-generation peacekeeping is the most unusual aspect of the book. 
There have been ten such operations, beginning with the Congo on 1960 and going on 
UNTIES in 1996 in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. The essence of 
these second generations operations, he points out, is that they are or . . . were much more 
comprehensive, with the UN attempting a near-simultaneous management of political, 
societal, economic, humanitarian, electoral, diplomatic, and military initiatives. (p. 26) 
Richard Singes study of UNOMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique) fits into the second-
generation category. Hillen explores the four major types of peacekeeping from a military 
perspective, looking at command and control techniques and procedures, force 
composition, force size, geographical representation and neutrality of the force, and the 
ensemble of military objectives or missions. This approach is a welcome complement to 
Paul F. Diehls classic treatment in his International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993).  
It is Hillens thesis that the United Nations operates best at the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum, especially at the observation mission or traditional peacekeeping level, where 
military skills play a less important role than diplomatic or political considerations. At 
these levels what appear as military inefficiencies, say, in the command and control area 
or force to area ratios, can be offset by other skills or by a relatively benign environment. 
At the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, the Security Council began to 
underestimate the complexity of the tasks it was asking second-generation peacekeeping 
missions to undertake, especially in terms of the deployment of military units and 
assignment of goals. Assigning blame in a scholarly fashion, Hillen does not excuse the 
United Nations but also faults the great powers for overloading the international 
organization with challenges it is ill equipped to handle, thereby having avoided 
grappling with the problems. It is a form of evasive foreign policy.  
Richard Singe also finds fault with aspects of the United Nations operation in 
Mozambique, but he considers far more than the military aspects of the nation-repairing 
operation which was designed to institutionalize the 1992 Rome peace accord between 
the Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) government and its Renamo (Mozambican 
National Resistance) opponents. This was one of the nastiest civil wars in all of Africa 
and invited the attention of neighboring white-ruled Rhodesia (until 1980) and apartheid 
South Africa as patrons for their Reamo client. The author criticizes the United Nations 
for failing to complete the land mine removal program in Mozambique, although he 
commends the organization for monitoring the 1994 general election as well as for its 
innovative approach to demobilizing two rival arms that had held much of the nation in 
thrall. Still, there were ample caches of undeclared arms, which have trickled into South 
Africa and added to the levels of civic violence and crime. He also shows, as Christopher 
Clapham has done on a wider scale in his Africa and the International System: The 
Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), just how 
displacing United Nations and non-governmental organizations can be in terms of 
African state sovereignty. At times, they can be alternate or surrogate governments. 
Additional pressure for conflict resolution in Mozambique came from its neighbors, some 
of whom supplied military units to guard land transportation corridors, so that regional 
powers and interests can serve to reinforce international pressures and rewards.  
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